Abstract. Tweakable blockciphers, first formalized by Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner [13], are blockciphers with an additional input, the tweak, which allows for variability. An open problem proposed by Liskov et al. is how to construct tweakable blockciphers without using a pre-existing blockcipher. This problem has yet to receive any significant study. There are many natural questions in this area: is it significantly more efficient to incorporate a tweak directly? How do direct constructions compare to existing techniques? Are these direct constructions optimal and for what levels of security? How large of a tweak can be securely added? In this work, we address these questions for Luby-Rackoff blockciphers. We show that tweakable blockciphers can be created directly from Feistel ciphers, and in some cases show that direct constructions of tweakable blockciphers are more efficient than previously known constructions.
Introduction
A blockcipher, also known as a pseudorandom permutation, is a pair of algorithms E and D. The encryption algorithm E takes two inputs -a key K and a message block M , and produces a ciphertext block C of the same length as M , while the decryption algorithm D reverses this process. A blockcipher is considered secure if, for a random secret key K, the cipher is indistinguishable from a random permutation.
A tweakable blockcipher takes an extra input, the tweak ,(T ), that is used only to provide variation and is not kept secret. Unlike changing the key, changing the tweak should involve minimal extra cost. A tweakable blockcipher is considered secure if it is indistinguishable from a family of random permutations indexed by the tweak. The Hasty Pudding Cipher by Schroeppel [23] was the first to introduce an auxiliary blockcipher input called a "spice" and Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner [13] later formalized the notion of tweakable blockciphers. Liskov et al. describe two levels of security: a secure (CPA) tweakable blockcipher is one that is indistinguishable from a random permutation family to any adversary that may make chosen plaintext queries, while a strongly secure (CCA) tweakable blockcipher is pseudorandom even to an adversary that may also make chosen ciphertext queries.
Tweakable blockciphers have many practical applications. Liskov et al. describe how they can be used to implement secure symmetric encryption and authenticated encryption. Halevi and Rogaway [10, 11] suggest an immediate application to private storage where the tweak is set to be the memory address of an enciphered block; and thus, the encryptions of two blocks with the same plaintext are not likely to look the same and yet decryption remains straightforward. Tweakable blockciphers have also been studied in a variety of other contexts [1, 12, 22, 2, 16] .
Feistel Blockciphers. Feistel blockciphers [7] have been an actively studied class of constructions, since Horst Feistel invented them in 1973. In particular, Luby and Rackoff showed how to construct a pseudorandom permutation from a pseudorandom function by composing three (or four in the case of CCA security) Feistel permutations [14] . We call this construction the Luby-Rackoff blockcipher. In 1996, Lucks [15] described an optimization for the secure 3-round version by replacing the first round with a universal hash function. Shortly afterwards, Naor and Reingold [17] provided the analogous optimization for the strongly secure 4-round cipher, replacing both the first and last rounds with a more general type of function. In 2001, Ramzan [20] formally studied many variations on the Luby-Rackoff cipher. Patarin gave proofs of security for certain constructions against unbounded adversaries with access to exponentially many queries, albeit assuming the individual round functions are random functions rather than pseudorandom. Specifically, Patarin proved security for 7 rounds against q 2 k queries, where the blockcipher input is of size 2k [18] , and later improved this to show that 5 rounds is sufficient, both for chosen-plaintext and chosenciphertext attacks [19] , which remains the best proven security level for Feistel ciphers. Dodis and Puniya recently provided a combinatorial understanding of Feistel networks when the round functions are unpredictable rather than pseudorandom [6] .
Our Work. Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner [13] give two constructions for tweakable blockciphers, each one constructed from an underlying blockcipher. Subsequent work has also taken this approach; Halevi and Rogaway's EMD and EME modes [10, 11] and Rogaway's XEX mode [22] were all blockcipher modes of operation. The only examples of specific tweakable blockciphers are the Hasty Pudding [23] and the Mercy [4] ciphers.
One open problem proposed by Liskov et al. was to study how to incorporate tweaks into existing blockciphers, or design tweakable blockciphers directly. In this work, we perform a systematic study of issues relating to directly tweaking Luby-Rackoff blockciphers. We analyze the approach of including a tweak by XOR-ing the tweak value into one or more places in the dataflow. This natural model for adding a tweak changes the cipher minimally. Also, approaches involving more direct cryptographic processing of the tweak (e.g. hashing the tweak) have a significant additional cost associated with changing the tweak.
Our Contributions. We present tweakable Luby-Rackoff blockciphers, for both CPA and CCA security, and against both polynomial-time adversaries, and against unbounded adversaries with q 2 k queries 1 , where k is half the size of the input (matching the best result for ordinary blockciphers [19] ). Specifically, we construct tweakable blockciphers:
-CPA-secure against polynomial adversaries in 4 rounds (Theorem 3) -CCA-secure against polynomial adversaries in 6 rounds (Theorem 8) -CPA-secure against q 2 k queries in 7 rounds (Theorem 4) -CCA-secure against q 2 k queries in 10 rounds (Theorem 11)
Recall that for polynomial adversaries CPA-security requires only 3 rounds whereas CCA-security requires 4. It is thus natural to wonder if our constructions are optimal. We prove our constructions against polynomial adversaries are indeed round-optimal in our model (Theorems 1 and 7). Furthermore, we show that any construction of 6 or fewer rounds in our model can be attacked with O(2 k/2 ) queries (Table 1) , so our construction of Theorem 4 is also round-optimal. In addition, the attacks used to prove the round-optimality of our constructions, as well as our extension of the proof methods of Naor and Reingold, help to form the theoretical foundation necessary for the secure design of tweakable blockciphers regardless of construction, as well as shedding light on the difficulties in adding a tweak to Feistel-based blockciphers such as RC6 [21] and MARS [3] . We also explicitly address the problem of incorporating tweaks of arbitrary length, an important issue not addressed in the literature. 2 We show that our CPA-secure constructions can incorporate additional blocks of tweak at the cost of 1 round per block (Theorems 13 and 16), and that our CCA-secure constructions may be similarly extended at the cost of 2 rounds per block of tweak (Theorems 14 and 17).
Definitions
A tweakable blockcipher is a triple of algorithms ( G, E, D) for key generation, encryption, and decryption, respectively. We restrict our attention to tweakable blockciphers where G(·), E K (·, ·), and D K (·, ·) are all efficiently computable algorithms; and where the correctness property holds; that is, for all M, T, and for all keys
We also generally assume that G(1 k ) draws keys uniformly at random from {0, 1} p(k) for some polynomial p.
We have two notions of security: (1) chosen-plaintext secure (CPA) and (2) chosen-ciphertext secure (CCA). Security is defined in terms of both a polynomial and an exponential adversary; polynomial adversaries are limited to a number of queries and computations polynomial in the message size, whereas an exponential adversary is allowed unlimited computation, but is bounded by an exponential number of queries relative to the message size.
Definition 1. Over all adversaries with access to an encryption oracle, the maximum advantage is defined as:
is a random permutation family parameterized by its second input, and (3) A is allowed to run for t steps and make at most q oracle queries.
Definition 2. Over all adversaries with access to an encryption and decryption oracle, the maximum advantage is defined as:
ADV-STBC K ( e E, e D, q, t) = max A : |Pr[A e E K (·,·), e D K (·,·) (1 k ) = 1] − Pr[A Π(·,·),Π −1 (·,·) (1 k ) = 1]| where (1) for all k, K is generated by G(1 k ), (2) Π, Π −1 are a
pseudorandom permutation family and its inverse, and (3) A is allowed to run for t steps and make at most q oracle queries.
A tweakable blockcipher is CPA secure if for all k, forueries and time t, ADV-TBC K ( E, D, q, t) is negligible in k. A tweakable cipher is said to be polynomially-secure if q and t are polynomial in k. If t is unspecified, then it may be unbounded. We define CCA security in the same manner.
The Feistel Blockcipher
Recall the formula for the Feistel blockcipher [7] 
where the output after n rounds is (L n , R n ), and each f i is a pseudorandom function specified by the key. Further recall that the 3-round Feistel construction is secure against chosen plaintext attacks, and the 4-round construction is secure against chosen ciphertext attack [14] . In order to talk about where to add a tweak, we must first establish some notation. Unless otherwise specified, the tweaks we refer to are a half-block in length; that is, on input M of size 2k, the tweak is of size k. As we will later see, a blockcipher may allow for longer tweaks; we think of these as "multiple tweaks," as conceptually, the longer tweak can be thought of as being composed of multiple tweaks, each of the same size.
Notation
For an n-round Luby-Rackoff construction, a single half-block of tweak can conceivably be XOR-ed in at any of the following unique locations:
Let this set be denoted by Λ n . We illustrate the Λ 3 (3-round) locations in Figure 1 .
Let T λ be the XOR of all the tweaks used at location λ ∈ Λ n . The formula for our construction is:
We use "BC(n, λ)" to refer to the tweakable blockcipher construction where the number of Luby-Rackoff rounds is n and a tweak T λ is XORed in at some location λ ∈ Λ n . To denote adding multiple tweaks, we write "BC(n, λ 1 , . . . , λ t )", where T λ i = T i is the tweak for location λ i and different locations each have their own independent tweak. Thus, in such a construction, the tweak size is tk.
We might also want to denote adding the same tweak value at two or more locations. We write this as "BC(n, λ 1 + λ 2 )", where the implication of using the compound location λ 1 + λ 2 is that T λ 1 = T λ 2 . Of course, we may also consider a construction with multiple tweaks, each of which may be a compound location; we use the obvious notation for this. We use the symbol Γ to denote a (possibly) compound tweak location.
In Λ n , we have listed all tweaks at ".5" locations, i.e., R l+0.5 for some l. However, we do not have to consider these locations.
Since L m and R m+1 are equivalent, we will use them interchangeably. This starts us off with a reduced set of tweakable constructions to study including tweaks at locations L n , R 0 , . . ., R n and all combinations thereof.
Tweakable Blockciphers With CPA Security
In this section, we focus on achieving CPA security. In the next section, we will discuss the stronger CCA notion of security.
We begin by presenting some general results that hold for an arbitrary number of rounds. These results will help us to narrow down the possibilities for secure constructions and to prove the optimality of our final construction. As stated in Section 3, the set of possibly secure constructions includes those with tweaks at locations L n , R 0 , . . ., R n and all combinations thereof. However, we remark in Lemma 3 that we do not need to consider all possible locations, and that some locations can be simulated without directly tweaking the blockcipher; this important observation is used frequently throughout the paper. Proof. We can simulate oracle queries with or without the tweaks in L n R n , R 0 , or R 1 . To simulate a query (L 0 , R 0 , T 1 , . . . , T t ) to a construction with these tweaks, we make a query (
. . , T t ) to the construction without these tweaks to obtain (L n , R n ), and we return (L n ⊕ T L n , R n ⊕ T R n ). Decryption queries can be simulated similarly.
The set of tweak locations we need to consider is thus reduced to {R 2 . . . , R n−1 }. From here on, we consider Λ n to be {R 2 , . . . , R n−1 }.
Proof. We use a 2-query attack. If we query (L, R, T ) to get (L n 1 , R n 1 ), and then query (L,
Thus, we arrive at our first round-specific conclusion. Proof. This follows from Lemmas 3 and 4, and the set {R 2 , . . . , R n−2 } being empty for n = 3.
Secure Locations
We have reduced the set of possible secure single tweak locations to {R 2 , . . . , R n−2 }. We now show that each of these locations are secure for n ≥ 4. However, first we must define − ARCU 2 hash functions and introduce some related work. Proof. We can capitalize on Theorem 2 as follows. We will prove that when we let
) over random choice of f m−1 and f m , these conditions hold. Here, h is comprised of the last two rounds of the construction before the tweak, including the tweak. Once we prove this, the result will follow: the first m − 2 rounds are a permutation, so if h is comprised of the first m rounds, it will be − ARCU 2 if h is. Furthermore, since m ≤ n − 2, there are at least 2 more rounds to follow; any further rounds are another permutation and pseudorandomness will be maintained.
, where f 1 and f 2 are randomly chosen over the domain of all functions from k bits to k bits, is − ARCU 2 , for
, which is 2 −k , so the probability we hit a collision is at most ( 
From the Lemma, if all the round functions are random, then the h we are interested in is − ARCU 2 . By Theorem 2, BC(n, R m ) is indistinguishable from a random function if all round functions are random. Therefore, BC(n, R m ) must be CPA secure if its round functions are pseudorandom (since random functions are indistinguishable from random permutation families). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Corollary 1 (CPA Security In 4 Rounds). BC(4, R 2 ) is CPA-secure and round-optimal.
Proof. This follows directly from Theorems 1 and 3.
Exponential Attacks
In this section, we investigate the security of tweakable blockcipher constructions against an adversary who is capable of making an exponential number of queries. We provide general attacks against several types of tweakable constructions built from Luby-Rackoff permutations. In this section, we assume all round functions are ideal, in other words, that they are uniform random functions. 3 We consider a construction secure against exponentially many queries if the probability of any computationally unbounded adversary allowed q 2 k queries to distinguish the construction from a random permutation family is negligible in k. These attacks appertain to constructions with both single and compound tweak locations (where the same tweak value is XOR-ed in multiple locations) and are used to prove that all constructions of less than 7 rounds can be distinguished from a random permutation family in O(2 k 2 ) queries.
Proof. The attack is as follows: fix the message and query with 2 k 2 different tweaks. The probability that two different queries lead to the same output is negligible for a random permutation family. However, the probability that two queries lead to a collision in this construction is not negligible. On each query, the internal values stay constant until the input to f r+1 . Since we have made 2 k 2 queries to an ideal round function, we can expect with non-negligible probability to get a collision on the output of f r+1 for two distinct queries. If we get such a collision, notice the entire output ciphertext will collide.
Proof. The attack is identical to that used in Lemma 6, except that instead of expecting a collision of the type
Proof. For this proof we will first need a result from probability. Proof. Let p i be the probability that some element is picked twice in i tries.
We know that for m ≥ 1.2 × 2 k/2 , 1 − p m < .5 (since the birthday threshold is approximately 1.1774 × 2 k/2 ). Let m be the first value for which 1 − p m is less than .5, and let p = p m . Then,
Since, similarly to our above analysis, 1 − p will be equal to (1
Since m is the first value for which 1 − p is less than .5,
The attack is as follows: Compute the m described in Lemma 8. Keep the message constant and query with m different tweaks. The probability that two ciphertexts are such that L n ⊕T = L n ⊕T is significantly higher for the actual construction than for a random permutation family. Since m ≤ 1.2 × 2 k 2 , this attack can be performed by an exponential adversary. Notice that the internal values of any pair of queries are the same up to the input of f r+1 . For every query, f r+1 receives a different input (as the input is a fixed value XOR-ed by the tweak). Since the round functions are ideal, the event of getting a collision on two outputs of f r+1 with m different queries reduces to the event of picking the same element twice as described in Lemma 8; say that probability is p. Notice that if such a collision happens, we always get a collision of the type,
Assume that the outputs of f r+1 are distinct for each of the m queries. Notice that in order to have a collision of two R n−2 values, it must be true that the L n−2 values differ for both queries, because the intervening rounds act as a permutation. Therefore, we will get a collision on R n−2 if and only if we have a collision of the type:
Since the probability of such a collision for any two queries is either 2 −k or 0 (in the case that the L n−2 values coincide), we can bound the probability of having such a collision above by
Therefore, in this case, with probability greater equal to .28, we can assume all R n−2 values are distinct. Notice:
The probability of such an event occurring over m queries with distinct R n−2 and ideal round functions is, again, p. Therefore, the overall probability of getting at least two ciphertexts with the described property is at least p + (1 − p) (.28p) .
If the construction we are given is the random permutation family, the probability of getting the coincidence described is clearly p. Therefore the difference in probabilities of this event happening for the tweakable construction and the random permutation family is at least p + .28p(1 − p) − p = .28p (1 − p) . Since p and 1 − p are non-negligible in k (by Lemma 8) , this value is also non-negligible, and therefore our attack successfully distinguishes the two constructions.
Proof. The generalization of Lemma 7 to Lemma 3 is identical to the extension of Lemma 6 to Lemma 2.
These four attacks can be used to attack every tweakable Luby-Rackoff blockcipher of 6 or fewer rounds. A rundown of which general attack applies for each construction can be found in Table 1 . We do not include L 1 , R 1 , L 6 or R 6 in the possible locations, or their equivalent constructions of Table 1 since they can be simulated away by Lemma 3. We now show a 7-round Luby-Rackoff construction that is secure against an adversary allowed q 2 k queries.
A Tweakable Construction Secure for q
Proof. To prove that this construction is a secure tweakable blockcipher we utilize the following theorem from Patarin [18] :
Theorem 5 (Patarin) . Let F be a function from 2k bits to 2k bits. If F has the property that for q 2 k queries, the probability of having
.R i l is negligible, (where R i j is the right half of the j'th output of F ), and on distinct inputs F has only a negligible probability of a full collision on its outputs, then E • F ,(where E is a four-round Luby-Rackoff function), is indistinguishable from random for q 2 k input queries.
We decompose our 7-round construction into two functions, F and E, where F is the first three rounds, including the XOR-ed tweak at both L 3 and R 3 , 4 and E is the last four rounds. It is obvious that E is a four-round Luby-Rackoff function. To prove that F has the properties enumerated in Theorem 5, we need to prove the following two properties about F . Lemma 9. F is such that for any two distinct queries, the probability of the outputs being equal is O(2 −2k ) and the probability of the right halves of the outputs being equal is O(2 −k ).
Proof. We show here that given two queries, the probability of an equality in the right half of the output is at most 2 −k+1 , and that the probability of both outputs being equal is at most 2 −2k+1 .
We call the two queries L 0 , R 0 , T and L 0 , R 0 , T respectively. We also assume that these queries are distinct, that is that either L 0 = L 0 or R 0 = R 0 or T = T . For ease of notation, we define δR n as R n ⊕ R n , and
We divide this proof down into three cases, δR 0 = 0, δR 0 = 0 but δL 0 = 0, and finally, δR 0 = δL 0 = 0 and but δT = 0.
Case 1: δR 0 = 0. In order for δR 3 ⊕ δT = 0 to be true, (i.e. the right halves of the outputs are equal), we must have that δf 1 (R 0 ) = δL 0 ⊕ δf 3 (R 2 ) ⊕ δT . Since δR 0 = 0, δf 1 (R 0 ) is a random value. Therefore the probability that the equation is true, which is the probability that the right half of any two outputs are equal, is 2 −k .
In order for δL 3 ⊕ δT = 0, (i.e. the left halves of the outputs are equal), we must have that δf 2 (L 0 ⊕ f 1 (R 0 )) = δR 0 ⊕ δT . If δL 0 ⊕ δf 1 (R 0 ) = 0, this occurs with probability 2 −k . Furthermore, given this, because δL 0 ⊕ δf 1 (R 0 ) = δR 2 , the probability that δf 3 (R 2 ) = δf 1 (R 0 ) ⊕ δL 0 ⊕ δT is 2 −k , and therefore, the probability of a full collision is 2 −2k .
However, δL 0 ⊕δf 1 (R 0 ) = 0 occurs with probability 2 −k . In that case, in order to have δL 3 ⊕δT = 0, we must have δT = δR 0 . If δR 3 ⊕ δT = 0 as well, we know δf 1 (R 0 ) = δL 0 ⊕ δf 3 (R 2 ) ⊕ δT , but since δL 0 = δf 1 (R 0 ) in this case, this implies that δf 3 (R 2 ) = δT = δR 0 = 0, yet, this can occur with probability at most 2 −k . Therefore, the probability of an overall collision is at most 2(2 −2k ) = 2 −2k+1 .
Case 2: δR 0 = 0 and δL 0 = 0. In order for δR 3 ⊕ δT = 0 to hold, we must have that δf 3 (R 2 ) = δf 1 (R 0 ) ⊕ δL 0 ⊕ δT holds. Note that δR 2 = δR 0 ⊕ δf 2 (R 1 ) = δf 2 (R 1 ), and δR 1 = δL 0 ⊕ δf 1 (R 0 ) = δL 0 = 0. If δR 2 = 0, there is a collision on the right only with probability 2 −k . However, the probability that δR 2 = 0 is 2 −k , so the probability of a collision on the right is at most 2 · 2 −k .
In order for the δL 3 ⊕ δT = 0 to be true, we must have
) is random. Therefore the equation is true with probability 2 −k . So the probability of the left halves of the output being equal is 2 −k .
If the left halves are equal, we know that δf 2 (R 1 ) = δT . Recall that δR 2 = δf 2 (R 1 ), so if δT = 0, then δR 2 = 0 so δR 3 ⊕ δT = δL 0 = 0. However, if δT = 0 then the probability that δR 3 = δT is at most 2 −k . Therefore, the overall probability of a collision in this case is at most 2 −2k .
Case 3: δR 0 = 0 and δL 0 = 0. This case is trivial. Since the message queries are equal, δR 3 = δL 3 = 0. However, δT = 0, therefore δR 3 ⊕ δT = δL 3 ⊕ δT = 0. Therefore the outputs are never equal in either half of the output.
The overall probability that two distinct queries will have the same output is at most O(2 −2k ) and the probability that the right half of the outputs will be equal is at most O(2 −k ). Thus, we have proven Lemma 9.
So long as the queries the adversary makes do not produce a full collision on F or a multi-collision on the right half of the output of F , the responses are indistinguishable from random. Therefore, the queries of the adversary are independent of the outputs of F so long as the required conditions hold. By Lemma 9, the probability of an overall collision in q 2 k queries is O(q 2 2 −2k ) which is negligible. Similarly, the probability of an l-way multicollision on the right is O(
/ , which will be true for sufficiently large k, this probability is bounded by 2 −k . Thus, F satisfies the necessary properties with all but a negligible probability, which completes our proof of Theorem 4.
Tweakable Blockciphers With CCA Security
In this section, we study the problem of achieving CCA security. An important observation to make in constructing a CCA-secure tweakable blockcipher is a distinguishing attack we will call the four-message attack, which is a type of Boomerang attack [25] . The attack can be performed by any adversary with access to encryption and decryption oracles, E and D respectively. To perform the attack, the adversary makes four queries:
1. For an arbitrary message M and tweak T , obtain C = E(M, T ).
For an arbitrary tweak
A wide class of tweakable blockciphers fall to the four-message attack: g 1 (M ) ). Now if we decrypt C with tweak T , we obtain M = g
Note in particular that if both g 1 and g 3 are permutations, the conditions are satisfied. This has immediate consequences:
Proof. Here, g 1 is the permutation described by the m rounds of Luby-Rackoff before the tweak, g 2 (T ) = 0 k ||T for BC(n, R m ) and g 2 (T ) = T ||T for BC(n, R m + R m+1 ), and g 3 is the remaining n − m rounds. Clearly g 1 and g 3 are permutations, so the four message attack applies.
This shows that if we are to be able to add a half-block of tweak to the construction anywhere, it must be used at multiple locations, and those locations must be separated by at least one round. 5 In fact, however, a one round distance will not suffice:
Proof. To simplify, recall that R m + R m+2 is equivalent to R m+0.5 by Lemma 1. Noticing this makes it clear why this is unlikely to be secure, in light of the previous two corollaries, but we still have some work to do.
Here, we use the four-message attack again, but this time, suppose g 1 and g 3 are not permutations. Rather, if (L, R) is the output of the first m rounds of the Luby-Rackoff permutations, then g 1 (M ) is the 3k bit response (L, R, R). Notice that g 2 (T ) is 0 2k ||T , and g 3 (A, B, C) computes the remaining rounds, computing L m+1 = B and R m+1 = f m (C) ⊕ A, and continuing from there. Note that g 3 (g 2 (T ) ⊕ g 1 (M )) is the output we get from applying BC(n, R m+0.5 ) to M with tweak T . For the BC(n, R m + R m+1 + R m+2 ) construction, this is just the same as BC(n, R m+0.5 +L m ), and change g 2 so that it produces T ||0 k ||T rather than 0 2k ||T . Clearly g 1 is injective and invertible, and g 3 has unique inverses of the proper form, which we can find by inverting the tweakable blockcipher and noting the values in the proper place. Doing so requires the tweak T , but the answer is unique regardless, or we wouldn't have unique decryption. By Theorem 6, neither of these constructions are CCA-secure.
Theorem 7. For all n < 6 and all compound locations Γ of elements in
Proof. In order to construct a CCA-secure tweakable blockcipher, we must use the tweak at (minimally) R m and R m+d for some d ≥ 3. And naturally, m and m + d must be in the range 2, . . . , n − 1 since all other locations can be simulated. For n ≤ 5 no such pair of locations exists.
Therefore, the first construction that can be CCA-secure is BC(6, R 2 + R 5 ), and is in fact a secure construction! Theorem 8. BC(6, R 2 + R 5 ) is a CCA-secure tweakable blockcipher.
Proof. We will actually prove a slightly stronger version of this theorem:
Proof. Again, we will modify the proof from Naor and Reingold to prove that our construction is CCA-secure. First, we define the following. The following theorem is proven by Naor and Reingold:
Theorem 10. If h 1 is drawn from an − ARCU 2 family of hash functions and h 2 is drawn from an − ALICU 2 family of hash functions, and E is two rounds Luby-Rackoff with a random round function, then the pair of oracles
2 ) are indistinguishable from random.
Since we know that 2 rounds of Luby-Rackoff with a random round function followed by a tweak is − ARCU 2 (by Lemma 5), all we need to prove is that two rounds with a random round function preceded by a tweak is − ALICU 2 .
Lemma 11. The function family defined by h(L, R, T ) = (L
where f and f are random functions, is − ALICU 2 , for = 2 −n + 2 −2n
Proof. Let (L, R, T ) be inputs to h −1 . The outputs will be h
. In other words, h −1 is actually just like the h function from Lemma 5, except with f as the first random function and f as the second one, and with the right and left halves switched. Thus, h is − ALICU 2 from Lemma 5.
Once we have this, we merely note that we have the properties needed by the Naor and Reingold proof to establish that our construction, with random functions in place of pseudorandom ones, is indistinguishable from a random function.
If we think of h 1 as the first m 2 − 2 rounds of BC(n,
where π 1 and π 2 are permutations, and h 1 is an − ARCU 2 hash function, so h 1 is also − ARCU 2 . If we think of h 2 as the last n − m 2 rounds of BC(n, R m 1 + R m 2 ) for m 2 ≤ n − 1, then h 2 is π 3 • h 2 where h 2 is an − ALICU 2 hash function, so h 2 is also − ALICU 2 . Since BC(n, R m 1 + R m 2 ) for 2 ≤ m 1 ≤ m 2 − 3 ≤ n − 4 is equal to h 2 ⊕ h 1 , where h 1 is an − ARCU 2 function and h 2 is an − ALICU 2 function, this construction is CCA-secure.
In particular, 2 ≤ 2 ≤ 5 − 3 ≤ 6 − 4, so BC(6, R 2 + R 5 ) is CCA-secure.
CCA Security Against Exponential Attacks Theorem 11. BC(10, L
Proof. In order to construct a tweakable blockcipher secure against CCA exponential attacks, we use a theorem of Patarin [19] :
Theorem 12 (Patarin) . Let F and F be functions from 2k bits to 2k bits. If F and F −1 each have the property that for q 2 k queries, the probability of having l > O(k) indices such that In our construction, the first three rounds, including the tweaks at L 3 and R 3 , form F , and the last three rounds, including the tweaks at L 7 and R 7 , form F . F −1 is just the same as F , except with distinct round functions. Both F and F −1 meet the properties of Theorem 12, as we have shown in our proof of Lemma 9. BC(10,
, and is therefore CCA-secure against q 2 k queries.
Allowing Longer Tweaks
In our previous results, all tweaks were assumed to be a half block in length. It may be desirable however, to have tweaks of arbitrary lengths. We can always lengthen a tweak that is less than a half block, by padding it in a deterministic way. However, increasing the length of a tweak beyond a half block in length does not follow easily. It may be useful to have constructions that are still secure with longer tweaks, as one usual way of choosing a tweak is to include data with it that makes it unique [23] . The longer the tweak, the more data can be included. In this section, we demonstrate that secure (CPA-secure) tweakable blockciphers exist with arbitrary tweak length at the cost of one additional round per half-block of tweak, and that the constructions we give are round-optimal. We then demonstrate in Section 6.2 that CCA-secure tweakable blockciphers exist with arbitrary tweak length at the cost of two additional rounds per half-block of tweak. (The optimality of this construction is an open problem.) First, we prove several lemmas about multiple tweak and compound tweak locations. We adopt the notation that Λ * n is the set of all compound tweak locations over Λ n .
Lemma 12.
For all n and
Proof. Suppose not; let j ∈ [1, t] be such that BC(n, Γ j ) is insecure. We can attack BC(n, Γ 1 , . . . , Γ t ) by following the attack on BC(n, Γ j ), but setting all tweaks other than T j to 0 k .
We can define Γ = i∈S Γ λ i , where S Γ is the set of locations used in Γ . If we do so, then clearly Γ + Γ = i∈S Γ ∆S Γ λ i where ∆ represents symmetric difference. We now show a generalization of Lemma 12.
Lemma 13. For all n and
Proof. If not, let S be such that BC(n, i∈S Γ i ) is insecure. We can attack BC(n, Γ 1 , . . . , Γ t ) by following the attack on BC(n, i∈S Γ i ) by setting all tweaks T j for j / ∈ S equal to 0, and all tweaks T i for i ∈ S equal to each other.
Lemma 14 (Combinations With The Same Tweak). For all n and λ
Proof. Since without loss of generality, all λ i are in {R 2 , . . . , R n−1 }, the only way the condition is not met is if all λ i are R n−1 . If r is even, the construction is equivalent to BC(n, ∅), while if r is odd, the construction is equivalent to BC(n, R n−1 ), both of which are insecure.
These three lemmas apply for any type of security.
CPA-Secure Tweakable Blockciphers with Longer Tweaks
Now we prove our result.
Theorem 13. For all n, one can use n− 3 half-blocks of tweak but no more. Specifically,
Proof. First we prove that no construction with more than n − 3 half-blocks of tweak can be secure. Consider the construction BC(n, Γ 1 , . . . , Γ t ). Following from the proof of Lemma 14, we can assume without loss of generality that each Γ i contains each location in Λ n at most once. Therefore, we can think of each Γ i as a vector of boolean coefficients a i = (a 2,i , . . . a n−1,i ) where a m,i = 1 implies that R m is included in Γ i . Since there are more than n − 3 of these vectors, we can find a nontrivial linear combination of vectors If the sum t i=1 b i a i is 0, we can break the cipher by querying (L, R, 0 tk ) and (L, R, T ) where T is a tweak that uses the same half-block tweak T 0 for each of the compound locations corresponding to S, but is 0 k for all other tweaks. The outputs will be the same in either case. If the sum is 1, we can make the same two queries to obtain (L n 1 , R n 1 ) and (L n 2 , R n 2 ). In this case, L n 1 ⊕ L n 2 will be T 0 . Next we prove that BC(n, R 2 , R 3 , . . . , R n−2 ) is secure. Following our proof of Theorem 3, we let h be the function that represents the first n − 2 rounds, including all the tweaks. We need only prove that h generated this way is − ARCU 2 . We can prove this by induction, regarding Lemma 5 as the base case. The inductive step will be:
Lemma 15. If h(L, R, T ) denotes a random member of an − ARCU 2 family, where h L and h R denote the left and right half of
Thus the probability of a collision is at most (2 −n + )
Thus, the h we are interested in is − ARCU 2 , for < n2 −n . By the proof of Naor and Reingold, BC(n, R 2 , . . . , R n−2 ) is secure.
CCA-Secure Tweakable Blockciphers with Longer Tweaks
It is not hard to increase the length of tweaks by generalizing the BC(6, R 2 + R 5 ) construction.
Theorem 14. For all n, the tweakable blockcipher BC(2n, R
Proof. The key point in the proof is that we can still conceptually divide the construction into three phases: h 2 • E • h 1 , where this time, h 1 represents the first n − 1 rounds, including the tweaks, and h 2 represents the last n − 1 rounds, and E represents the middle 2 rounds.
We know that h 1 is − ARCU 2 from Lemma 15, and proving that h 2 is − ALICU 2 follows from much the same proof as is given for Lemma 11.
Longer Tweaks with Exponential Security
In this section we focus on the problem of constructing a Luby-Rackoff tweakable blockcipher secure against an unbounded adversary with q 2 k queries. For t half-blocks of tweak, we show how to construct a Luby-Rackoff based tweakable blockcipher in t + 6 rounds that meets this security goal. The construction is based on a t + 2-round function F designed to meet the properties required by Patarin.
.R i l is negligible, (where R i j is the right half of the j'th output of F ), and on q distinct inputs F has only a negligible probability of a full collision on its outputs.
Proof. To clarify, the construction of F for all i ≤ t, uses tweak T i at L i+2 , and also at the following locations:
Before we give the proof, it will be helpful to explain a little of the intuition behind our construction. The basic idea is that each tweak is included at its own round; they are included on the left only for simplicity of presentation: apart from the tweak included at L t+2 , all tweaks could be included on the right instead.
Tweaks included at locations involving only L 1 and L 2 allow for a full collision attack, as we explain in Section 6.4, so those locations are not useful as the sole location of a tweak. However, if two tweaks were to appear at L i and L i+2 , respectively, we could set them equal to each other; this would be equivalent to having one fewer tweak, but with one tweak at R i+1. 5 , which leads to the attack described in Lemma 6. So, to avoid that kind of attack, we use L 1 and L 2 to ensure that no two tweaks are used only at two individual locations that are two apart. We include every other odd tweak (starting with T 3 ) at L 1 and every other even tweak (starting with T 4 ) at L 2 .
With those locations, F would be successful at preventing full collisions, but large multicollisions on the right could be forced: simply put, the last tweak may not affect the right half of the output. Therefore, we include T t at R t+2 , so that every block of tweak affects the right half of the output. However, this leads to an attack if we aren't careful: if T t is used at R t+2 alone, and T t−1 is used at L t+1 alone, they effectively occur at the same spot. Our solution is to force one of the two to appear at either L 1 or L 2 while the other does not: we do this by adjusting the only case that is a problem, namely when t ≡ 2 mod 4.
We now prove that the F we have given above has the properties we need. Define T 0 to be ⊕ i≡0 mod 4 T i . If t ≡ 2 mod 4 then define T −1 to be T t ⊕ i≡3 mod 4 T i ; otherwise, define T −1 to be
i=0 T 2i , and define T od = ⊕ (t+1)/2 i=−1 T 2i+1 . Define T te to be T t if t is even, and 0 otherwise; similarly, define T to to be T t if t is odd, and 0 otherwise. We are also using the δ notation where
and δL i and δT i are defined similarly.
First, we focus on the probability of a full collision on two distinct queries.
Lemma 16. On any pair of distinct inputs, the probability that F will produce the same output on each is O(2 −2k ).
Proof. In order for two queries to yield a collision of F , we must have the following two equations. 6
Note that R i is involved in one of the two equations above for every 0 ≤ i ≤ t − 1; R i for odd i are involved in the first equation, while R i for even i are involved in the second equation. We consider three cases.
Case i: There is an even i < t + 2 such that δR i = 0, and there is an odd j < t + 2 such that δR j = 0. In this case, the probability of both equations holding is 2 −2k .
Case ii: For all i < t + 2, δR i = 0. If this is the case, it is easy to see that δR 0 = 0, and δL 0 = 0 (since δR 1 
Therefore, all the tweak values must also remain constant up to T t−1 . But if both L 0 and R 0 are the same, and all the tweak values up to T t−1 are the same, then the difference on the right of the output will be the difference in T t , so if there is a collision, T t = 0. Therefore, both queries will be the same. So the probability of a collision in this case is 1, but the probability of two distinct queries leading to this case is 0.
Case iii: Either for all odd i < t + 2 or for all even i < t + 2, δR i = 0, but there is some j < t such that δR j = 0. This covers all remaining cases, but this case is one to worry about. A priori, one of the two equations may be true with probability 1, while the other is true with probability 2 −k . However, as we will see, either one of a small number of unlikely events occurs, or an overall collision cannot occur unless the two inputs were identical.
Lemma 17. In two distinct queries to F for which either for all odd i < t + 2 or for all even i < t + 2, δR i = 0, the probability of a full collision on F is O(2 −2k ).
Proof. Let j be such that δR j = 0 but for all i > j of the same parity, δR i = 0. Suppose, without loss of generality, that j is even; the case when j is odd is very similar.
Since for all odd i < t + 2, δR i = 0, we learn that if i ≥ 2 is odd, then
And therefore, δf i (R i−1 ) = δT i−3 . If i − 1 < j, then for this equation to be satisfied, we either must have a rare event (that δR i−1 = 0 but the random outputs happen to have a pre-specified difference), or δR i−1 = 0. If i − 1 > j, then by our choice of j, δR i−1 = 0. Therefore, all for all even i − 1 other than j or 0, δR i−1 = 0, or two rare events must occur. We also know that δR 0 = 0, because -Since δR j = δf j (R j−1 ) ⊕ δR j−2 ⊕ δT j−3 , and δR j−1 = δR j−2 = 0, we know δT j−3 = δR j .
We also know that δL 0 = 0 since δL 0 = δR 1 ⊕ δf 1 (R 0 ) (except if j = 0, which we will handle as a special case.)
Note that because the two output halves are equal, this lets us conclude that δT t = 0 and that δT t−1 = 0. Recall that:
In one of these two equations, both δT t and δT t−1 appear (the one for which T te or T to is nonzero); in the other, only δT t does. All other terms come out to zero; in one equation, only δT j−3 and δT j−1 are not guaranteed to be 0, but these are equal to each other. In the other, δT j−2 is not guaranteed to be 0, and neither is f j+1 (R j ), which appears in the same equation, but again, these two are equal. Thus, from the equation in which T t appears alone, we conclude δT t = 0, and from the other one we then conclude that δT t−1 = 0.
If we assume that j ≥ 4 then we know that both δT 0 = 0 and δT −1 = 0. One of those two terms includes one of T j−3 and T j−1 , but not both, and all other tweaks included must remain unchanged. Therefore, both δT j−3 and δT j−1 are 0. But we know that 0 = δR j = δT j−1 , so this is a contradiction. If j = 3, then δT 0 = δT 2 , but all other even-numbered tweaks are unchanged. Since T 2 is not part of T 0 , we note that all the other terms in T 0 are known to have no difference between the two queries. Therefore, δT 0 = 0 and so δT 2 = 0, which then implies that δR 3 = 0, which is a contradiction.
If j = 2, then δT −1 = δT 1 , but all other odd-numbered tweaks are unchanged. Since T 1 is not part of T −1 , we can conclude that δT −1 = 0, which is a contradiction. If j = 1, then we conclude that δL 0 = δT 0 , via a similar deduction. Because all even-numbered tweaks are 0, we get δT 0 = 0 = δL 0 . Since δR 0 = 0, we know that δR 1 = δL 0 ⊕ δf 1 (R 0 ) = 0, which is a contradiction.
If j = 0, we know that δT = 0 for all i. Since 0 = δR 2 = δf 2 (R 1 ) ⊕ δR 0 ⊕ δT −1 and δT −1 = δR 1 = 0, we get that δR 0 = 0, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, if two distinct queries are such that either for all odd i < t+2 or for all even i < t+2, δR i = 0, but there is some j < t + 2 such that δR j = 0 then at least two rare events must occur in order for an overall collision to occur: therefore, the probability of a collision in this case is at most O (2 −2k ). This completes the proof of Lemma 17.
Since in cases i and iii, the probability of a collision is at most O(2 −2k ), and the probability of case ii is 0, the overall probability of a full collision is at most O(2 −2k ).
Next, we prove that for any pair of distinct queries, the probability of a collision on the right is at most O(2 −k ).
Lemma 18. On any pair of distinct inputs, the probability that F will produce the same output on the right in each is O(2 −k ).
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that t is odd; if not, the proof is similar. If t is odd, then whenever two queries lead to a collision on the right, we have
If for some even i < t + 2 we have δR i = 0, then the probability of a collision occurring is 2 −k . Let us assume, then, that for all even i < t + 2, we have
Thus, either δR i−1 = 0 or this equation is true with probability 2 −k . Let us assume that in all such cases, δR i−1 = 0; if not, the overall probability of a collision is at most O(2 −k ).
If
Thus we know that all the odd-numbered tweaks up to T t−2 do not change between the two queries, including the value T 0 . But similarly, if 1 ≤ i < t + 1 is odd then δT i−3 = 0.
If a collision occurs, we also have that δT t = δR t+2 = δf t (R t+1 ) ⊕ δR t ⊕ δT t−1 = δT t−1 . We have been able to deduce that δT = 0 for −1 ≤ i ≤ t − 2. We have included T t in T 0 and T −1 in such a way that regardless of t mod 4, T t is involved in one that T t−1 is not involved in, or vice-versa. Since δT 0 = δT −1 = 1, this allows us to conclude that both δT t and δT t−1 are 0. Therefore, at least one "coincidence" must occur in order to produce a collision on the right half of the output, if the two queries are distinct. Therefore, the probability of such a collision is at most O(2 −k ).
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 16 and Lemma 18. We can once again apply the principle of deferred decisions, and furthermore, q 2 k queries will not allow a non-negligible probability for the failure of either condition. The reasoning is parallel to that given in the proof of Theorem 4.
This now allows us to prove two quick theorems: Proof. This follows from Theorem 15 and Theorem 12. Here, F • E • F requires 2(t + 2) + 4 = 2t + 8 rounds.
Minimality of F
Here, we show that the F we have given is minimal in terms of rounds in order to meet the properties required by 5.
Lemma 19.
If F is a Luby-Rackoff based blockcipher incorporating t tweaks, and F has n < t + 2 rounds, then certain pairs of queries can lead to an overall collision on the output of F with probability O(2 −k ).
Proof. Without loss of generality, the location for each tweak can be expressed in terms of compound locations based on the locations L 1 , . . . , L n . (Again, L 0 and R 0 can be simulated away). Let Γ 1 , . . . , Γ t be the compound locations for T 1 , . . . , T t , respectively. Let Γ i be defined as the portion of Γ made up of only L 3 , . . . , L n , for each i.
Since n < t + 2, there are fewer than t locations in L 3 , . . . , L n . Therefore, there will be some linear dependency among the Γ values, that is, there will be some i such that for some S ⊂ {1, ...n} such that
Therefore, by Lemma 13, such a construction is insecure; the compound location j∈S Γ j will consist of only locations from L 1 and L 2 .
Note that L 1 and L 2 on their own can be thought of as equivalent to L 1 + R 0 and L 2 + L 0 , respectively. Those constructions fall to the attack of Lemma 6. L 1 + L 2 can be thought of as equivalent to L 0 + L 1 + L 2 which is the same as R 1.5 + R 2 , which falls to the attack of Corollary 2.
Security Level
Blockciphers Prior TBCs [13] This paper CPA with polynomial queries 3 rounds [14] Table 2 summarizes our constructions, compared to regular blockciphers and the second construction of Liskov et al. [13] . This table shows that our results are better for CPA constructions, equivalent for CCA against polynomial attacks, and worse for CCA against exponential ones.
Conclusion
We have presented a systematic study of issues relating to directly tweaking the large class of Luby-Rackoff blockciphers. Specifically, we have given constructions for both CPA and CCA security, and against both polynomial and exponential attacks, and have considered the problem of incorporating long tweaks. We have proven some of our constructions to be round-optimal in our model.
We conclude with some open problems: (1) incorporating tweaks securely into other blockcipher structures, (2) direct, specific design of tweakable blockciphers (Luby-Rackoff or otherwise) and (3) improving the provable level of security for tweakable blockciphers in general.
